The recent global financial crisis has spurred renewed interest in identifying those reforms in bank regulation that would work best to promote bank development, performance and stability. Building upon three recent world-wide surveys on bank regulation (Barth et al., 2004 (Barth et al., , 2006 (Barth et al., , 2008 , we contribute to this assessment by examining whether bank regulation, supervision and monitoring enhance or impede bank operating efficiency. Based on an un-balanced panel analysis of 4050 banks observations in 72 countries over the period 1999-2007, we find that tighter restrictions on bank activities are negatively associated with bank efficiency, while greater capital regulation stringency is marginally and positively associated with bank efficiency. We also find that a strengthening of official supervisory power is positively associated with bank efficiency only in countries with independent supervisory authorities. Moreover, independence coupled with a more experienced supervisory authority tends to enhance bank efficiency. Finally, market-based monitoring of banks in terms of more financial transparency is positively associated with bank efficiency.
Introduction
Well-functioning banking systems exert a first-order impact on economic growth and development (e.g., see Levine, 1997 Levine, , 2005 . Banking systems, however, do not always function in a beneficial manner so as to achieve this important goal. The recent global financial crisis underscores this unpleasant fact. The response of policymakers to these situations is typically an assessment of what went wrong and what regulatory reforms can promote better functioning banking systems.
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the assessment of the types of reforms in bank regulation that work best to achieve wellfunctioning banking systems. We specifically focus on the extent to which regulation enhances or impedes the ability of banks to operate efficiently. While this is just one aspect of a well-functioning banking system it is certainly an important one. Policymakers can surely make more informed decisions about the regulation of banks when they know the likely effect of those decisions on bank performance. Despite the extensive literature on bank efficiency (see Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Berger, 2007 , for reviews of the literature), a comprehensive study on whether bank regulation, supervision and monitoring enhance or impede efficiency does not yet exist. This is mainly due to limited data availability so as to obtain concrete measures on various aspects of bank regulation and supervision schemes.
This data limitation has been recently addressed by three worldwide surveys on bank regulation and supervision conducted by Barth et al. (2004 Barth et al. ( , 2006 Barth et al. ( , 2008 under the auspices of the World Bank. The surveys contain information regarding a wide range of bank regulations and supervisory practices, such as capital regulation, entry regulation, activities restrictions, supervisory power and independence, external governance and private-sector monitoring. Overall, the three surveys provide a comprehensive and detailed picture of differences in bank regulation and supervision in countries, thereby providing an excellent opportunity to examine whether bank regulation, supervision and monitoring enhance or impede bank efficiency.
The predictions about the effects of regulation and supervision on banks are not clear from a theoretical perspective. There are two general views that provide conflicting predictions, as explained more fully by Barth et al. (2006) , among others. The ''public interest view'' holds that the government acts in the interests of the public and regulates banks to promote efficient banking and 0378-4266/$ -see front matter Ó 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.04.030 ameliorate market failures. In contrast, the ''private interest view'' holds that regulation is often used to promote the special interests of the few, not the broader public, thereby impeding bank efficiency. Given these two opposing views, and with similar conflicting predictions based on various theoretical models about the impact of specific regulations like capital requirements on bank performance, 1 empirical studies are important in helping inform policy decisions. Building on these recently available bank regulation datasets, we examine an extensive and changing set of regulations and supervisory practices on bank efficiency using data for more than 4050 banks in 72 countries over the period [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . The bank efficiency measures are constructed based on a widely adopted and non-parametric method to gauge the extent to which the performance of individual banks deviates from that predicted for the ''best practice'' banks (i.e., efficiency frontier). We then use these measures to examine whether regulation, supervision, and monitoring enhance or impede bank efficiency.
We obtain the following main results. First, we find that tighter restrictions on bank activities are negatively associated with bank efficiency, while greater capital regulation stringency is marginally and positively associated with bank efficiency. One should therefore be aware that when tightening bank activities restrictions and strengthening bank capital requirements, both of which are mainly designed to reduce bank risk, there may be conflicting impacts on efficiency. Second, strengthening official supervisory power is positively associated with bank efficiency only in countries with independent supervisory authorities. Furthermore, greater independence of the supervisory authority itself tends to enhance bank efficiency. This result is important as it suggests that greater independence of supervisory agencies from both politicians and banking firms enhances supervision effectiveness and bank efficiency. It also suggests that putting official supervisory power in the hands of independent supervisors might be helpful in improving the overall efficiency of banking systems. Finally, increased market-based monitoring of banks in terms of more financial transparency and better external audits is positively associated with bank efficiency. We obtain similar results in a dynamic setting, where we explore the impacts of changes in bank regulation and supervision schemes on the change in bank operating efficiency to account for potential time-invariant unobservable factors that might affect both the regulation schemes and bank efficiency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the literature on the effect of bank regulation, supervision, and market monitoring on bank efficiency. Section 3 presents our measures of bank efficiency, bank regulation and supervision, and market monitoring variables. It also discusses our data sources and provides summary statistics for our variables. Section 4 presents our empirical results and discusses their implications. Section 5 provides some robustness tests as checks on our findings. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper with a discussion of the policy implications.
The relevant literature discussion
This section summarizes relevant literature pertaining to the effect of bank regulation, supervision, and market monitoring on bank efficiency.
Capital regulation and bank efficiency
Capital regulation is considered to affect bank performance insofar as it specifies the required amount of capital that bank owners must have at risk. If bank owners are required to have more capital at risk, the upside gains that they would enjoy from greater risk taking would be countervailed by the potential downside loss of their capital. Therefore, official capital adequacy regulations are believed to play a crucial role in aligning the incentives of bank owners with depositors and other creditors, which results in more careful lending and better bank performance (Keeley and Furlong, 1990; Kaufman, 1991; Barth et al., 2006) . However, this belief seems to be based on the public interest view and tends to ignore possible regulatory costs in the form of a higher barrier to entry and greater rent extraction by governments that result from higher capital requirements. In addition, adherents of a private interest view tend to oppose stringent regulations unless it can be shown that the benefits exceed the costs, and there is little hope of finding an alternative solution to adverse incentive problems. Thus, they generally would oppose reliance on stringent capital regulation given these mixed views about the outcome of a higher capital requirement. These arguments leave the effect of capital regulation on bank efficiency ultimately an empirical question.
Activity restrictiveness and bank efficiency
As summarized in Barth et al. (2006) , there are different views on the effects of activity restrictions. Such restrictions can limit the exploitation of economies of scope and scale in gathering and processing information about firms, building reputational capital and providing various types of services to customers (Barth et al., 2000; Laeven and Levine, 2007) . By limiting a bank's activities, regulatory restrictions could also impede its ability to diversify income streams and reduce the franchise value of a bank, which might limit the incentive for efficient behavior. Moreover, the private interest view would generally argue that the restrictions can be structured so as to give discretion to the regulators, and thus their bargaining power for rent seeking (Djankov et al., 2002) . These arguments seem to imply a negative relationship between activity restrictiveness and bank efficiency. Yet, broad financial activities might intensify moral hazard problems and provide more opportunities for banks to increase risk taking (Boyd et al., 1998) . Moreover, broad activities may lead to the formation of extremely large and complex entities that are extraordinarily difficult to monitor and ''too big to discipline'' (Laeven and Levine, 2007) . Therefore, the overall effect of activity restrictions on bank efficiency is an empirical question that we explore. 2 2.3. Official supervisory power, its independence and bank efficiency As argued in Beck et al. (2006) , the public interest view argues that bank supervisors have the incentive and expertise to overcome market failures due to imperfect information. Therefore, a powerful supervisory agency that directly monitors and disciplines banks can enhance the corporate governance of banks and boost bank efficiency. In this regard, supervisory power is expected to be positively associated with bank efficiency. However, the private interest view argues that powerful regulators/supervisors will not focus on overcoming market failures; rather, they will focus on promoting their private interests. As Beck et al. (2006) political benefits. Thus, supervisor power might be negatively associated with bank efficiency.
Supervisory independence also plays a crucial role in the formation of a well-functioning banking system. It enables the supervisors to be insulated from, or able to resist, pressure and influence to modify supervisory practices in order to cater to narrow political or business interests. Supervisory independence thus allows bank supervisors to monitor the financial condition of banks in a strictly professional and consistent manner. Moreover, supervisory independence allows supervisors to elicit the banks' views, including constructive criticism, of the guidance and advice they give to banks. Both the public interest and private views of regulation point to the need for independent regulatory agencies to improve bank efficiency. Despite the importance, very little is known about the relationship between supervision independence and bank performance. We provide the first comprehensive empirical analysis of this important issue. In addition, we explore the interplay effect between supervisory power and supervisory independence to assess whether independent supervisors make better use of supervisory power in enhancing bank efficiency.
Market monitoring and bank efficiency
It is argued that bank supervisory policies should focus on strengthening the ability and incentives of private investors to overcome informational barriers so that they can exert effective monitoring and governance over banks (Beck et al., 2006) . Many economists advocate greater reliance on the private sector and express misgivings over the heavy emphasis placed on official supervision of banks. An important reason for this concern is that supervisors do not have an ownership stake in banks, which might generate different incentives than private creditors when it comes to monitoring and disciplining banks. Furthermore, the private interest view of regulation holds that banks will pressure politicians to unduly influence regulators/supervisors to take actions that mainly serve the special interests of the banks. Consequently, placing a greater reliance on market discipline to promote better functioning banks is important. In line with these arguments, Barth et al. (2006) document that supervisory agencies in many countries compel banks to produce reliable, comprehensive and consolidated information on the full range of bank activities and risk management procedures and hold the bank management legally accountable for accurate information disclosure. Nevertheless, great cross-country variation remains in the supervisory schemes empowering private monitoring. We explore the effect of these supervisory schemes on bank efficiency, expecting a positive link between market monitoring and bank efficiency.
Sample and variables

The sample
The dataset used in this study is compiled from two main sources: (1) the BankScope database provided by Bureau van Dijk and Fitch Ratings, which has comprehensive coverage of banks in a large number of countries and accounts for over 90% of all banking assets in each country. The information for each bank consists of detailed balance sheet and income statement data, with up to 200 items and 36 pre-calculated financial ratios, and (2) the Barth et al. (2004 Barth et al. ( , 2006 Barth et al. ( , 2008 datasets on bank regulation, supervision and monitoring, which is a comprehensive database compiled from the answers provided by official regulatory and supervisory authorities.
We match the bank-level information with the bank regulation measures to explore the link between bank regulation, supervision 3 Accordingly, we calculate the average bank efficiency scores across these same three periods, respectively. Also, the inputs/outputs data used in estimating bank efficiency scores as well as the independent variables are based on the corresponding 3-year averages. One advantage of using data averaged over the 3-year period is that we smooth variables that vary over time (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2004) . Furthermore, due to the incomplete overlap among the three datasets and missing firm-level and banking-sector variables, the final sample used in our study contains an unbalanced panel of 4053 banks (8115 bank-period observations) in 72 countries over the time period 1999-2007. The list of the countries can be found in Table 3 .
In addition to the three datasets mentioned above, we rely on two other data sources, the World Development Indicator and the World Governance Indicator compiled by Kaufmann et al. (2006) . Variables from these datasets are used to control for macroeconomic and institutional factors that might affect the overall level of bank efficiency in a country. Tables 1 and 2 identify the data sources and provide brief descriptions and summary statistics for the key variables.
Bank efficiency
Our measures of bank efficiency are obtained using a non-parametric method, namely data envelopment analysis (DEA). 4 The envelopment of data for the entire sample of banks using this approach enables one to identify the best practice banks that form the non-parametric efficient frontier. Other banks are allowed to deviate from this frontier and therefore to exhibit some degree of inefficiency. We then specify our model based upon the standard financial intermediation approach to evaluate the relative efficiency of banks. This approach was originally developed by Sealey and Lindley (1977) and posits that total loans and securities are outputs, whereas deposits along with labor and physical capital are inputs.
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This approach to modeling financial intermediation has been widely adopted and used in the literature. Following more recent applications (e.g., Casu et al., 2004; Drake et al., 2006) , we posit an intermediation model that has four inputs and three outputs. The three basic inputs (Xi) are: X1 (total deposits + total money market funds + total other funding); X2 (personnel expenses as labor input); and X3 (total fixed assets as physical input). We also include another input X4 (loan loss provisions) to capture the risk/potential costs in making loan decisions. As Drake et al. (2006) point out, it has long been argued in the literature that the incorporation of risk/loan quality is vitally important in studies of bank efficiency. More specifically, Laeven and Majnoni (2003) argue that risk should be captured in an efficiency analysis through the inclusion of loan loss provisions, which could be viewed as a cost or an input. As stated by them, ''. . . loan loss provisions required to build up loan loss reserves 3 We tried some alternative ways to assign values, such as moving all the thresholds one year before or 1 year later and found the results to be quite robust.
Another way was to try a longer time period but consistent results were obtained in this case as well. 4 The non-parametric efficiency approach was originally developed by Farrell (1957) and subsequently has been widely used in the bank efficiency literature (please see Section 4 for more detailed discussion). 5 We have also used the profit approach to measure bank operation efficiency, along the lines of Drake et al. (2006), and find the results to be robust. The book value of equity divided by total assets times 100 BankScope Activities restrictions
The extent to which banks may engage in (a) underwriting, brokering and dealing in securities, and all aspects of the mutual fund industry, (b) insurance underwriting and selling, and (c) real estate investment, development, and management. Unrestricted = 1: full range of activities can be conducted directly in the bank; Permitted = 2: full range of activates can be conducted, but some or all must be conducted in subsidiaries; Restricted = 3: less than full range of activities can be conducted in the bank or subsidiaries; and Prohibited = 4: the activity cannot be conducted in either the bank or subsidiaries. Higher values indicate greater restrictiveness Barth et al. (2006) Overall capital stringency Whether the capital requirement reflects certain risk elements and deducts certain market value losses from capital adequacy is determined. Specifically, it is an indicator developed based on the following questions Official Supervisory Power Principal component indicator of 14 dummy variables: 1. Does the supervisory agency have the right to meet with external auditors to discuss their report without the approval of the bank? 2. Are auditors required by law to communicate directly to the supervisory agency any presumed involvement of bank directors or senior managers in elicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse? 3. Can supervisors take legal action against external auditors for negligence? 4. Can the supervisory authority force a bank to change its internal organizational structure? 5. Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to supervisors? 6. Can the supervisory agency order the bank's directors or management to constitute provisions to cover actual or potential losses? 7. Can the supervisory agency suspend the directors' decision to distribute: (a) Dividends? (b) Bonuses? (c) Management fees? 8. Can the supervisory agency legally declare -such that this declaration supersedes the rights of bank shareholders -that a bank is insolvent? 9. Does the Banking Law give authority to the supervisory agency to intervene that is, suspend some or all ownership rights -a problem bank? 10.
Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the supervisory agency or any other government agency do the following: (a) supersede shareholder rights? (b) Remove and replace management? (c) Remove and replace directors? Barth et al. (2006) Supervisory independence The degree to which the supervisory authority is independent from the government and legally protected from the banking industry. The indicator is constructed based on the following three questions. should be considered and treated as a cost. A cost that will be faced with certainty over time but that is uncertain as to when it will materialize.'' (p. 181). Based on these considerations, we include loan loss provisions as a fourth input in our model.
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With respect to the three outputs (Yi), they are: Y1 (total customer loans + total other lending); Y2 (total other earning assets:
other interest generating assets such as bonds and investment securities); and Y3 (other, non-interest, income). The inclusion of the latter output is included so as not to penalize those banks with a relatively large share of non-traditional bank activities. The efficiency scores are obtained from these inputs and outputs using the DEA method described in more detail in Section 4.
Activity restrictiveness
This variable indicates whether bank activities in (a) underwriting, brokering and dealing in securities, and all aspects of the mutual fund industry, (b) insurance underwriting and selling, and (c) 6 An anonymous referee suggested that capital be included as an input since the rank ordering associated with DEA may be affected depending upon whether it is included or excluded. This in turn may affect the empirical results. However, our empirical results are unaffected when capital is included as an input, and these results are available from the authors upon request. Kaufmann et al. (2006) Government effectiveness The indicator measures the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. The value of year 2005 is used in this study.
Higher values mean higher quality of public and civil service Kaufmann et al. (2006) Rule of law The indicator measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
Capital stringency
This variable indicates whether the capital requirement incorporates certain risk elements and deducts certain market value losses when capital adequacy is determined. Specifically, it is an indicator based on a summation of the answers to the following questions (Yes = 1, No = 0): 1. Is the minimum capital-asset ratio requirement risk weighted in line with the Basle guidelines? 2. Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of an individual bank's credit risk? 3. Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of market risk? 4. Before minimum capital adequacy is determined, which of the following are deducted from the book value of capital: (a) market value of loan losses not realized in accounting books; (b) unrealized losses in securities portfolios? (c) Unrealized foreign exchange losses? Higher values of this variable indicate greater stringency.
Supervision
We use three variables to measure the strength, independence and experience of the bank supervisor. These are as follows:
(1) The variable Official Supervisory Power is constructed from 14 dummy variables that indicate whether bank supervisors can take specific actions against bank management, bank owners, and bank auditors both in normal times and times of distress. This includes information on whether the supervisory agency can force a bank to change its internal organizational structure, suspend dividends, stop bonuses, halt management fees, force banks to constitute provisions against actual or potential losses as determined by the supervisory agency, supersede the legal rights of shareholders, remove and replace managers and directors, obtain information from external auditors, and take legal action against auditors for negligence. (The exact definition and construction of Official Supervisory Power is provided in the data appendix.) The first principal component indicator of these variables is used, with higher values indicating broader and greater authority for bank supervisors. (2) The variable Supervisory Independence is an aggregate indicator which measures the degree to which the supervisory authority is independent from the government and legally protected from the banking industry. Specifically, the variable is constructed based on the following three questions. 
Monitoring
We use four variables to measure the degree of monitoring by external auditors and the public (through information disclosure). First, the variable Certified Audit Required is an index which measures whether an external audit by licensed auditors is a compulsory obligation for banks. Second, the variable Strength of External Audit measures the effectiveness of external audits of banks. It is an indicator based on answers to the following questions (Yes = 1, No = 0): 1. Is an external audit a compulsory obligation for banks? 2. Are specific requirements for the extent or nature of the audit spelled out? 3. Are auditors licensed or certified? 4. Do supervisors get a copy of the auditor's report? 5. Does the supervisory agency have the right to meet with external auditors to discuss their report without the approval of the bank? 6. Are auditors required by law to communicate directly to the supervisory agency any presumed involvement of bank directors or senior managers in illicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse? 7. Can supervisors take legal action against external auditors for negligence? Higher values of the indicator indicate that more information is provided by the external audit. Third, the variable Bank Accounting is an index which measures whether the income statement includes accrued or unpaid interest or principal on nonperforming loans and whether banks are required to produce consolidated financial statements. Higher values indicate more informative bank financial statements. Better information disclosure can facilitate the monitoring of banks by both the auditor and the public. And fourth, the variable Deposit Insurance Coverage is the ratio of deposit insurance coverage to deposits per capita. Deposit insurance intensifies the moral hazard problem in banking because depositors do not face the risk of losses, which diminishes the incentive to and effort at monitoring bank activities. Hence, higher values of this index indicate less private monitoring.
Other controls
We also control for banking sector concentration. Specifically, we use the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI), which is equal to the sum of the squares of the market shares (deposits) of each individual bank in the individual countries. The (normalized) Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ranges from 0 to 1, with a higher value indicating greater monopoly power. 7 We expect greater banking concentration to be negatively associated with bank efficiency. This is because a concentrated banking market potentially allows a few powerful banks to dominate and thereby stymie competition with deleterious effect on efficiency (e.g., Demirguc-Kunt and . More concentrated power allows bank managers to relax their efforts on improving performance, whereas the pressure of a competitive market provides incentives to managers to perform better and also provides information for the use of appropriate incentive schemes (e.g., Berger and Hannan, 1998; Allen and Gale, 2000) . In addition, we control for banking-sector state ownership. It is well known that state ownership of firms is usually associated with lower firm efficiency because the government tends to pursue nonprofit driven goals, such as supporting employment and maintaining social stability (e.g., Megginson and Netter, 2001 ). La argue that state-owned banks are controlled by politicians who use the banks to maximize their own political and personal objectives, such as providing jobs for political supporters and bailing out poorly performing state-owned enterprises (SOEs). We therefore include a variable to measure the ownership structure of the banking industry. In particular, the variable State Owned Bank is included and is the fraction of the banking system's assets in banks that are 50% or more owned by the government, which is obtained from Barth et al. (2006) . Unfortunately, we do not have information on privatizations/nationalizations to capture any dynamic effect associated with the government ownership variable.
We control for bank size to capture the potential size effect on bank lending behavior. The variable Bank Size equals the logarithm of total bank assets in millions of US dollars. We also control for Bank Equity, which is the ratio of the book value of equity to total assets.
Country controls
The empirical analysis also includes several country-level variables to control for differences in economic development and institutions across countries. We include GDP per capita to capture the economic development of a region/country. Also, we include the natural logarithm of GDP to capture the size of an economy and we control for inflation in an economy. Lastly, we include a series of political and institutional quality indexes as a check on the robustness of the results. These are the World Governance Indexes (Kaufmann et al., 2006) , which are constructed from 276 individual variables taken from 31 different sources produced by 25 different organizations. The indexes measure different dimensions of governance, which include Government effectiveness, Political stability, Regulatory quality, Rule of law, Voice and accountability, and Control of Corruption. The detailed definitions can be found in Table 1 . We expect that banks tend to be more efficient in more developed countries and in countries with higher quality institutions.
Methodology
Data envelopment analysis (DEA)
We apply a widely used non-parametric method, data envelopment analysis (DEA), to obtain bank efficiency scores and then perform second-stage regressions to examine the relationship between bank regulation, supervision and monitoring and bank efficiency. There are several advantages of a non-parametric technique like DEA relative to parametric techniques, such as the stochastic frontier or production function approaches. First, the latter require one to assume a particular functional form, thereby imposing a specific structure on the shape of the efficient frontier. This means that the deviations in efficiency measures between individual banks and the best practice banks on the efficient frontier will be dependent on how accurately the chosen functional form captures the true relationship. As DEA is non-parametric and envelops the multiple inputs/outputs data of the sample banks, the derived efficiency measures do not suffer from this problem of functional form dependency (e.g., see Drake et al., 2006) . Second, DEA focuses on individual observations rather than on the population average, as compared with regression analysis. According to Banker and Natarajan (2008) , the simulation results indicate that DEA-based procedures perform better than parametric methods in the estimation of an individual decision-making unit (individual bank in our case) productivity. Third, DEA compares bank performance to the revealed best-practice frontier, rather than on the central-tendency properties of the frontier. Lastly, Banker and Natarajan (2008) show that a two-stage DEAbased approach comprising a DEA model followed by a maximum likelihood estimation yields a consistent estimator that performs at least as good as parametric methods in the estimation of the impact of the contextual variables on the efficiency scores.
The operational efficiency score for a bank is estimated as the fraction of actual inputs that is required for the bank to be located on the efficient frontier to produce the same level of output. Suppose the sample size is n and there are m inputs and s outputs for each bank. Denote x k = (x 1k , x 2k , . . . , x mk ) as a m Â 1 vector of inputs for bank k, X = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) as a m Â n matrix of inputs, y k = (y 1k , y 2k , . . . , y sk ) as a s Â 1 vector of outputs for bank k, and Y = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n ) as a s Â n matrix of outputs, respectively. The variable returns to scale DEA model can be expressed with the following linear programming problem for each bank k (k = 1,2,. . ., n):
where I 1 denotes an n Â 1 vector of ones, u k denotes a scalar parameter, and k k = (k 1k , k 2k , . . ., k nk ) 0 denotes a n Â 1 non-negative vector of parameters.
The DEA model has an intuitive interpretation. For each bank k, a virtual output Yk k is constructed as a weighted output of all the banks by choosing some non-negative weights k k P 0; I 0 1 k k ¼ 1. It then seeks to expand the virtual output Yk k as much as possible, subject to the inputs constraint of bank k: Xk k 6 x k . The virtual output Yk k is then compared with the actual output y k of bank k. If the maximized virtual output Yk k is above the actual output of bank k by a scalar factor of u k > 1, then the bank k is inefficient. Otherwise, the bank k is located at the efficient frontier since u k = 1.
The input-oriented efficiency score is defined as e k = 1/u k (0 6 e k 6 1) for bank k. Under the DEA method, a bank with an efficiency score of unity (100%) is located on the efficient frontier in the sense that its outputs cannot be further expanded without increasing its inputs. A bank with an efficiency score below 100% is relatively inefficient, suggesting that a bank can attain its current output level with fewer inputs.
In the second stage, we estimate the following equation to identify the determinants of the banking efficiency score e k :
where e k is the efficiency score for bank k. X k is a vector of explanatory variables, including a constant term, which represent bank regulation, supervision and monitoring as well as other control variables, such as bank industry characteristics and macroeconomic environment, as discussed in Section 3. u k is an error term with a standard error of r u . Since efficiency scores e k are truncated below from zero and above from unity, u k is an error term with doubletruncation. As a result, Simar and Wilson (2007) argue that the truncated regression estimation permits valid inference. We apply the standard maximum likelihood estimation with heteroskedasticity robust standards errors clustered by banks to allow for residuals to be correlated across times within banks (Beck et al., 2006) . Table 3 summarizes the bank efficiency scores. The second and third columns give un-weighted and weighted mean (by total loans) of individual bank efficiency measures within each country, respectively. More developed countries usually have higher bank efficiency measures. For example, developed countries such as Luxembourg, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States generally have measures higher than 0.8 or even 0.9, while middle-income countries such as Hungary, Russia, and Malaysia tend to have efficiency scores close to the mean level. Less developed countries such as Sudan, Senegal, and Nigeria tend to have measures much lower than the mean level. Column 3 presents the standard deviation of the efficiency measures within each country. As shown, the magnitude of the standard deviations of the measures for most countries is small relative to its mean, suggesting that within each country, there is not substantial variation of bank efficiency. A country's specific institutional and regulatory framework may be the major determinants of its banking firms' efficiency. Finally, columns 4 and 5 present lower and upper bounds of the efficiency measures based on a bootstrapping method at a confidence level of 95%.
Empirical results
Main results
We also checked the correlations among the bank regulation, supervision and other control variables and found that multicollinearity is not a serious problem. Most of the correlation coefficients are below 0.3, which makes us comfortable with simultaneously including these variables in the estimated models. Table 4 presents our main regression results. The dependent variable is the DEA bank efficiency measure or score based on truncated ML estimation. The first column summarizes the regression of the efficiency score on regulatory variables, such as activity restrictiveness, overall capital stringency, and a number of control variables, such as the Herfindal Index (HHI), government ownership of banks, bank size, bank equity (ratio), and a country's GDP and inflation. It is clear that more stringent bank activity restrictions are associated with less bank efficiency, as indicated by its negative and significant (at the 5% level) coefficient. A one standard deviation increase in activities restrictiveness decreases bank efficiency by 3.4%. Overall capital stringency is positive and marginally significantly (at the 10% level) related to bank efficiency. This result suggests that more stringent capital regulation has at best a weak relationship to bank efficiency. Stringent capital regulation may help reduce bank risk, but not be a highly significant benefit for efficiency gains. Overall, the net effect is positive and marginally significant. A possible reason for the relatively weak result, as suggested by an anonymous referee, is due to the inclusion of actual capital. In other words, the dominant effect on bank efficiency may be actual capital rather than the stringency of the capital regulations.
As for the control variables, less bank competition, as measured by the HHI, is indeed negatively and significantly related to bank efficiency. The government ownership of banks is also negatively related to bank efficiency, as indicated by the negative and significant coefficient. A 10% increase in government ownership of the banking sector reduces bank efficiency by 3%. These results support our earlier arguments that bank competition enhances bank efficiency, while government ownership may distort bank operations Table 1 for variable definitions. The dependent variable is the bank efficiency score. The estimation is based on truncated regression proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007) . The sample is a 3-period panel based on the average values of 1999-2001, 2002-2004, and 2005-2007 , respectively. A constant is included but not reported. The coefficient estimates are transformed to represent the marginal effects evaluated at the means of the independent variables. The marginal effect of a dummy is calculated as the discrete change in the expected value of the dependent variable as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. P-values are computed by the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for banks and are presented in brackets. * Statistical significance at the 10% level. ** Statistical significance at the 5% level. ÃÃÃ Statistical significance at the 1% level. 9 The correlation matrix for the variables is available from the authors upon request.
and hence reduce bank efficiency. However, as noted by an anonymous referee, the government ownership variable is relatively static in our analysis and thus does not capture the dynamic effect of previous and subsequent privatizations/nationalizations. We also find that large banks tend to have higher bank efficiency scores. This may be due to scale/scope economies in banking. A higher equity to asset ratio is also positively associated with bank efficiency. This suggests that well-capitalized banks may also have higher efficiency. A country's inflation is negatively associated with bank efficiency, suggesting that a lower inflationary environment is more conducive to efficient bank operations. A more developed country, as measured by a higher GDP per capita, tends to have more efficient banking. Finally, a larger market, as measured by a larger GDP level, is also associated with more efficient banks. Columns 2 and 3 present regressions of bank efficiency measures with official supervisory power and its independence as main regulatory variables. In both columns 2 and 3, we find that official supervisory power is not significant in explaining bank efficiency. In contrast, the average tenure of supervisors and the independence of the supervisory authority are both statistically and positively significant. This result suggests that strengthening supervisory power itself does not necessarily lead to higher bank efficiency. Instead, increasing the independence of the authority with supervisory power helps enhance bank efficiency. In addition, in column 3, the interaction term of official supervisory power and supervisory independence is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting that strengthening supervisory power is effective in improving bank efficiency in countries with more independent regulators/supervisors. To better understand the economic significance of our findings, consider the set of coefficients reported under column (3) of Table 5 . Those estimates imply that one-standard deviation increase in supervisory power increases operating efficiency of banks in countries with the most independent regulators by 5.5% more than a similar increase in supervisory power for banks in countries with the least independent regulators. Finally, the control variables all show similar coefficients as in the regression in Column 1.
Column 4 of Table 4 summarizes the regression results with variables related to market monitoring. In particular, we find that the strength of external audit, certified audit required, and bank accounting informativeness, are all positively and statistically significant in explaining bank efficiency. This suggests that the market monitoring mechanisms help to enhance bank efficiency. In addition to other control variables used in first three regressions, in column 4, we also find the coefficient of deposit insurance coverage/deposits per capita on bank efficiency to be negative and highly significant. This result suggests that the existence and generosity of deposit insurance may induce more adverse selection and moral hazard problems associated with it and hence producing a negative effect on bank efficiency.
Column 5 presents the overall results with a more complete set of regulatory variables. We find that the major regulatory variables retain their signs and significance as before, suggesting the main predictions of our model are quite robust when including these additional variables. The control variables also yield similar effects on bank efficiency as in previous regressions. Finally, the pseudo R 2 s are all above 0.3, suggesting good explanatory power of our regressions.
Robust checks: instrumental variables
In this section, we provide some robustness checks of our main results indicating that the type of regulatory environment matters for bank efficiency. In particular, we address a possible endogeneity problem that may be associated with our previous regressions and also try to control for more country-specific institutional variables.
A potential endogeneity problem could exist insofar as the main results in Table 4 may be due to reverse causality. A more efficient bank may influence regulatory policies in the direction of being more accommodative to the growth and development of the bank. In other words, the regulatory framework may be endogenous to the structure of the banking system in each country. To address this concern, we use an Instrument Variable (IV) approach. Following previous studies (Beck et al., 2006; Barth et al., 2009) , we select the instrumental variables based on the existing literature on law and finance (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Beck et al., 2003; Easterly and Levine, 1997; La Porta et al., 1998 , 1999 . Specifically, the literature (e.g. La Porta et al., 1999; Beck et al., 2003) shows that legal origins help explain the financial development today. Moreover, it also shows that the geographical environment plays an important role in shaping the financial institutional development (e.g., Beck et al., 2003) . It is less likely that these factors would have direct impacts on banking performance today. Instead, they might influence bank performance through their impact on bank regulations. Therefore, we follow the literature (e.g. Beck et al., 2006; Barth et al., 2009; Houston et al., 2011) and use legal origin, latitude, ethnic fractionalization, and the percentage of years that the country has been independent since 1776 as instrumental variables.
Following the literature (e.g., Beck et al., 2006) , we conduct overidentifying test and F test to assess the appropriateness of the instruments. As can be seen from the table, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid in all model specifications.
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Our main empirical results are robust to the IV regression analysis. In Table 5 , the coefficients of the main regulatory variables, the capital requirement, supervisory power and supervisory independence, and market monitoring, are all statistically significant and their signs are the same as in the regressions in Table 4 . Furthermore, the IV coefficients are larger than the OLS coefficients, indicating the existence of potential measurement error, which would tend to ''attenuate'' the coefficient estimates toward zero (e.g. Barth et al., 2009) . Similar results also obtain for the control variables. Taken altogether, the results for our IV estimations imply that our findings are robust to potential endogeneity concerns.
Robust checks: bank regulation changes
As Barth et al. (2008) point out, a large number of banking regulatory reforms have occurred in various countries over the past decade. Since these reforms arguably have had a meaningful effect on the regulatory environment, it is interesting to explore how the efficiencies of banks have responded to these regulatory changes. We compare the bank regulatory environment in year 1999 (using Survey I) with year 2006 (using Survey III). Briefly, some of the changes that have occurred are as follows. Most countries tightened restrictions during the past decade. The activities restrictiveness in many developing countries, such as Nicaragua, Kazakhstan, and Costa Rica, increased dramatically over this period. At the same time, restrictions have eased in such countries as Mauritius, Belgium, and Romania. Also, most countries have undergone some change in capital regulations. In our sample, the countries easing capital requirements are less numerous than those moving towards greater stringency. More specifically, countries like Belgium, Jordan, Slovenia, and Argentina have eased capital regulations, whereas Ecuador, Tunisia, Uganda, Slovak and Nigeria have dramatically tightened capital regulations over the past decade. 10 We are not claiming that these variables are the best possible instrumental variables. Instead, we argue that these instruments are grounded in the literature and they display explanatory power of bank regulation and supervision measures.
Many countries, moreover, have gone through some changes in the information disclosure requirements. In particular, the strength of the external audit has been improved in most countries. The improvements are more prominent in developing countries. As regards changes of Official Supervisory Power, most countries have moved to strengthen official supervision, or at least provide supervisors with more explicit power, most notably in countries such as Turkey, Ecuador, Nigeria and many other developing countries. Interestingly, countries like Australia, Botswana, Czech Republic, and the UK moved in the opposite direction. In fact, the UK authorities have established a working group to address concerns about excessive regulation and supervision (Barth et al., 2008) . Overall, many countries have strengthened capital regulation, empowered supervisory agencies to a greater degree, and improved financial statement transparency. Finally, with respect to changes of supervisory independence, about half of the countries have moved towards a more independent supervisory system and another half of the countries have moved towards a less independent supervisory system.
To examine the effects of regulatory changes on international bank efficiency changes, we use the first differencing estimation with three time periods (corresponding to the three surveys). Specifically, we examine the effect of the regulatory changes on the changes in bank efficiency. The sample thus contains observations for at least two consecutive observations and its size drops to between 4053 and 4090 banks. The empirical results are presented in Table 6 .
As can be seen from the table, the empirical results are highly robust to our previous findings. We find that the changes in activity restrictiveness, capital regulatory stringency, strength of external audit, certified audit requirement, bank accounting informativeness, supervisor tenure, and independence of supervisory authorities are positively associated with the changes in bank efficiency. We also find that the change in supervisory strength results in positive bank efficiency changes in countries with independent supervisory authorities. The control variables also yield similar results.
Robustness tests: more macro controls
We now address the issue of potential omitted variables. In addition to regulatory and macroeconomic variables, we include 1999-2001, 2002-2004, and 2005-2007 , respectively. A constant is included but not reported. The coefficient estimates are transformed to represent the marginal effects evaluated at the means of the independent variables from the interval regressions. The marginal effect of a dummy is calculated as the discrete change in the expected value of the dependent variable as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. P-values are computed by the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for banks and are presented in brackets. * Statistical significance at the 10% level. ** Statistical significance at the 5% level. *** Statistical significance at the 1% level.
a series of macro-institutional indexes in our model to test the robustness of the results. We include the World Governance Indexes complied by Kaufmann et al. (2006) to control for the effect of other countryspecific institutional variables on bank efficiency. The World Governance Indexes are entered as two separate measures, one calculated as the average value of the individual indexes and the other calculated as the first principle components indicator of these variables, with higher values indicating higher quality institutions. The empirical results are consistent with our previous findings. As Table 7 shows, all major explanatory variables and control variables maintain their signs and significance as before. As regards the new control variables, the Kaufmann indexes, we find that the both the average value and first principle component are positive and have statistically significant effects on bank efficiency. This result suggests that a better institutional environment in terms of law and regulations is generally conducive to more efficient banking.
We also conduct some other robustness checks. For instance, the recent development of the two-stage bootstrapping DEA (e.g., Simar and Wilson, 2007) introduces a random disturbance into the model. We test the robustness of the results using this new approach and find the results highly consistent. For brevity, the results are not reported but available from the authors upon request.
Conclusion
The recent global financial crisis has spurred renewed interest in assessing the appropriate regulatory reforms to mitigate, if not prevent, future banking crises. More generally, effort is being devoted to identifying the bank regulatory regime that works best to promote a well-functioning banking system. Such a system would be one that improves bank efficiency. In this regard, and building upon a recent world-wide survey, we examine the effects of bank regulation and supervision on bank operating efficiency. Based on our analysis, we find that bank regulation, supervision and market monitoring all exert significant impacts on bank efficiency. Regarding bank regulation, we find in particular that tighter bank activity restrictions exert negative impacts on bank efficiency, while greater capital regulation stringency exerts marginally positive effects on bank efficiency. The results imply there are potential tradeoffs between bank safety/soundness and efficiency. In addition, we find that a strengthening of official supervisory power is not significantly related to greater bank efficiency. 1999-2001, 2002-2004, and 2005-2007, respectively . D indicates the first-difference of the variable between two consecutive periods. The estimation is based on truncated regression proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007) . A constant is included but not reported. The coefficient estimates are transformed to represent the marginal effects evaluated at the means of the independent variables from the interval regressions. The marginal effect of a dummy is calculated as the discrete change in the expected value of the dependent variable as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. P-values are computed by the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for banks and are presented in brackets. * Statistical significance at the 10% level. ** Statistical significance at the 5% level. *** Statistical significance at the 1% level.
However, greater independence of the supervisory authority tends to enhance bank efficiency. In addition, there is a strong interaction and positive effect of official supervisory power and supervisory independence on bank efficiency. This result is important as it suggests that independence of supervisory agencies from both politicians and banking firms is conducive to improved bank efficiency. It also suggests that putting the official supervisory power in the hands of independent supervisors might be helpful to improve the efficiency of the banking system. We also find supervisor experience is positively related to bank efficiency.
Finally, market-based monitoring of banks in terms of more financial transparency is positively associated with bank efficiency. We find that an external auditor requirement, the strength of external auditor, and bank information disclosure are positively associated with bank operating efficiency, while generous deposit insurance coverage is negatively associated with bank operating efficiency. These results suggest the positive role that private monitoring can play in improving banking efficiency. The estimation is based on truncated regression proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007) . The sample is a 3-period panel based on the average values of 1999-2001, 2002-2004, and 2005-2007 , respectively. A constant is included but not reported. The coefficient estimates are transformed to represent the marginal effects evaluated at the means of the independent variables. The marginal effect of a dummy is calculated as the discrete change in the expected value of the dependent variable as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. P-values are computed by the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for banks and are presented in brackets.
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. ** Statistical significance at the 5% level. ÃÃÃ Statistical significance at the 1% level.
